

# **The Simon Review**

The Illinois Presidential Primary :  
How Romney Won and What It Meant

By: John S. Jackson

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# The Illinois Presidential Primary: How Romney Won and What It Meant

## Introduction

In 2012 the Illinois Presidential Primary was an important strategic victory for Mitt Romney in his march to the Republican Presidential nomination. It was a timely victory set at an important juncture in the complicated nominations calendar and one which helped boost his claim to be the party's favorite and the strongest candidate for the fall contest with President Obama. Likewise, it was also an important strategic opportunity squandered by Rick Santorum who ultimately lost both Illinois and soon thereafter any realistic opportunity for winning the presidential nomination. This paper will describe how Romney won and Santorum and the other candidates lost. It sets Romney's victory into the larger context of the national political picture at the time and assesses what his victory means in the context and recent history of Illinois politics.

This paper is a part of a much larger series of papers and monographs I have written on Illinois politics in general and on the Illinois presidential primaries in particular. Most of these have been published in The Simon Review or in Illinois Issues publications (Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 2004; Jackson, 2003; Jackson, 1983). The beginning of this series was, however, a monograph published by the University of Illinois Springfield and co-authored with David Everson and Nancy Clayton (Everson, Jackson, and Clayton, 1996). In that monograph we traced the history of the Illinois Primary all the way back to its beginning in 1912. More recently, I documented then-Senator Barack Obama's meteoric rise in Illinois and then in national politics through a paper on his 2004 U. S. Senate campaign and later his 2008 presidential campaign (Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 2008). This paper on the Republicans in 2012 is a continuation of that larger series chronicling the Illinois Presidential Primaries and other facets of Illinois politics.

## A Brief Recent History of the Illinois Primary

Illinois traditionally holds its primary the third Tuesday in March. This date is fixed by state law. This date is fairly early in the current presidential primary calendar, but not nearly as early as it used to be. The presidential primaries became the most important route to the presidential nomination beginning in 1972 when the McGovern Fraser Reforms in the Democratic Party led to a transformation in the way we nominate presidents. That transformation entailed a fundamental shift in the power to nominate the president moving it

from the party leaders, insiders and bosses who had dominated the older convention-centered system, to a newer system where the voters in the state primaries and caucuses became the essential power holders in the question of who the party's nominee would be (Jackson and Crotty, 2000; Shafer, 1988; Shafer, 1983; Ceaser, 1979). That shift, plus the limelight given to the early contests, stimulated a dramatic increase in the number of states holding presidential primaries and in the percentage of all national convention delegates who were selected by the primaries. All of a sudden the primaries which had been a secondary backdrop to the conventions became the central path to the nomination. The primaries became primary in gaining the nomination.

One of the direct consequences of this change has been the tendency for more and more states to move to earlier dates on the calendar in the year of the presidential election. This movement is called "frontloading" and it has become the order of the day in the new system. Candidates must understand this new calendar and develop their strategic plans for seeking the presidency very carefully. They must calibrate the raising of money and the use of their limited resources to fit the new realities of the frontloaded calendar. Harvard political scientist and party activist Elaine Kamarck has written cogently that "sequence is strategy", and she is quite right in that assessment (Kamarck, 2009). The candidate and staff who understand the calendar and how it intersects with their own interests and strengths and weaknesses most clearly is the candidate most likely to win the nomination.

Originally presidential primaries and caucuses started in March when the two first-in-the-nation contests were the Iowa Caucuses and the New Hampshire Primary. Since the reforms, these two states have retained their premier status, but their state contests have been moved earlier and earlier in the election calendar as other states have pushed toward holding their own contests earlier and earlier. This has become a knock down competition for which states get to go first with lots of inter-state competition and conflict developing.

In 2012, Iowa held its caucuses on January 3<sup>rd</sup>, and New Hampshire held its primary a week later on January 10<sup>th</sup>. This is as early as the states can go and still comply with the requirement that the nomination contests be held in the year of the presidential election. These two early states were then followed in quick succession by the South Carolina Primary held on January 21<sup>st</sup> and the Florida Primary on January 31<sup>st</sup> and then the Nevada Caucus held on February 4<sup>th</sup>.

Other states followed suit in February and early March reflecting this constant push toward the earliest date possible. This meant that when Illinois held its primary on March 20<sup>th</sup>, some 27 states plus American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands had already held their initial caucuses or primaries. Illinois, which used to be fairly early, was in the middle of the pack and even late in the politically effective calendar with its March 20<sup>th</sup> date in 2012.

In many previous years this now relatively late date would have rendered the Illinois Primary moot since the candidates for both parties would have already have been selected. Illinois and a lot of other states have routinely been left out of having any effective say in many years because of the frontloading phenomenon. This was the case, for example, in 2004, when the whole thing was over, settled by the results of "Super Tuesday" held on March 2<sup>nd</sup> when both John Kerry and George W. Bush cinched the nomination for their parties on that date. Illinois and all of the other states which came after March 2<sup>nd</sup> were simply superfluous in 2004. If the purpose of the nomination process is to name the party nominees, and to get to that decision as quickly and painlessly as possible for the party organization, then the frontloaded system usually fulfills that objective reasonably well. If the purpose is to allow the average voter, and as many voters as possible across the nation, to have a say in who the nominees for the two major parties will be, the primaries can serve this function well, but a truncated calendar seriously disenfranchises a vast proportion of the American people in many recent presidential years.

This tendency for an early settlement of the nomination and its potential for leaving Illinois high and dry and irrelevant to the real decision making on the presidential nomination has been widely recognized. No state likes to be left out of this high stakes game, and the Illinois General Assembly determined to not be ignored in 2008. That year the General Assembly moved the Illinois Primary to February 5<sup>th</sup> to be a part of the "Super Tuesday" crowd of 22 states holding their contests that day.

Also, since the General Assembly was under the control of the Democrats, this move was widely interpreted to be an attempt to assist Senator Barack Obama in his contest against Senator Hillary Clinton. It undoubtedly was so designed, and it clearly helped Obama to claim a split decision against Clinton that day. Illinois was the largest state Obama won on Super Tuesday in 2008, and his victory in Illinois helped off-set Clinton's considerable strength in a number of other big states that day. It was widely reported that Clinton's team was sure that she would win Super Tuesday so convincingly that the other candidates would give up after it was over. When that did not happen and Obama could claim to have done very well on Super Tuesday, and both his popular votes and delegate count gave credence to that claim, the next stage of what became political trench warfare was on, and it lasted until June. In 2008 Illinois played the role the Illinois General Assembly designed for it in helping the Obama campaign.

An unintended consequence was that it also helped Senator John McCain who won the Illinois Republican Primary handily that day. Since this was one of McCain's first victories in a large Midwestern state, Illinois helped put him over the top in his fight against Romney, Rudy Giuliani, Mike Huckabee, and Ron Paul in 2008. Thus, Illinois Republicans also had a say in choosing their nominee in 2008 in a way that they had not enjoyed in many earlier years.

After 2008, there was pressure in Illinois for the General Assembly to return to the more traditional March date. Every four years this is a state primary as well as a presidential primary. There are multiple other state and federal nominees selected in the Illinois primary as well as the national convention delegates. Laying aside the presidential contest, mid-March is actually fairly early for the selection of state and local candidates and it means a long delay between the primary and the general election in the fall. So, for 2012 Illinois reverted to the third Tuesday in March with no one quite knowing who that might benefit in the presidential race.

Since President Obama was essentially unchallenged for the Democratic nomination in 2012 it seemed clear that moving the Illinois Primary date was not likely to make any real difference to his campaign. It was, however, possible that the Republican nomination would not be settled by then and thus Illinois could indeed matter again for the Republicans in 2012. This was attractive to Illinois Republicans and turned out to be exactly what happened.

### The Republican Race in 2012

As the reader may remember, the 2012 Republican nomination contest attracted a variety of candidates including former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, former U S Senator Rick Santorum, former Speaker of the U S House, Newt Gingrich, businessman Herman Cain, who had never held office before, current U S Representative and Libertarian champion, Ron Paul, Governor Rick Perry of Texas, former Governor John Huntsman of Utah, U S Representative Michele Bachmann of Minnesota, and former Governor Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota.

The Republican race was hard-fought and deeply divisive. The early contests yielded more confusion than clarity to the race. The Iowa Caucuses, held two days after New Year's Day, were first announced to have been won, by a handful of votes margin, by Romney. That victory was widely publicized and gave Romney an early boost. More than two weeks later it was determined that Santorum had actually won by a narrow margin, but by then the spotlight had moved on, and Romney had benefitted from the typical first in the nation Iowa boost.

Exactly one week later, on January 10<sup>th</sup> Romney did win the New Hampshire Primary with 39.3% of the vote compared to 22.9% for Paul; 16.9% for Huntsman; 9.4% for Gingrich; 9.4% for Santorum, and less than 1% for Perry (NPR, March 26, 2012). Since Romney was from next door Massachusetts, and one of his homes where he frequently vacationed, was in New Hampshire, this victory was generally expected; however, coupled with the announced victory in Iowa, it gave him an early claim on the magical momentum which all candidates seek.

Then the contest moved to South Carolina on February 21<sup>st</sup> which Gingrich won with 40.4% of the vote; Romney was second with 27.8%; Santorum third with 17.0%; and Paul fourth with 13.0% (ibid.). This victory gave a temporary boost to the former Speaker and he

temporarily shot to the top of the national polls; however, that did not last long and South Carolina was one of only two states (the other being Georgia) Gingrich managed to win.

Next came Florida on January 31<sup>st</sup>. Florida is always important because of its size and its frontloaded date. Romney won Florida with 46.4% of the vote, compared to 31.9% for Gingrich; 13.3% for Santorum; and 7.9% for Paul (Ibid.). On February 4<sup>th</sup>, Romney took Nevada handily with 50% of the vote. This was a state with a large Mormon population, and Romney was widely expected to win it; however, by then victories were beginning to pile up and Romney seemed to be well on his way with the most momentum and the most victories so far.

Then the scene shifted and Rick Santorum's campaign caught fire. It was announced on January 19<sup>th</sup> that Santorum, not Romney, had won the Iowa Caucuses and that gave him some bragging rights although he could have used the boost earlier. On February 7<sup>th</sup>, Santorum won Colorado with 40.2% of the vote, compared to 34.9% for Romney; 12.8% for Gingrich; and 11.8% for Paul (NPR). Santorum also won the Minnesota Caucus easily outdistancing Paul in second place, while Romney came in third; and Gingrich fourth. Santorum also won the non-binding Missouri Primary that day with 55% of the vote. This was not good news for the front-runner and it was not a good way to help the argument that a Romney victory was inevitable.

Romney countered with a victory in the Maine Caucuses on February 11<sup>th</sup>, but it was a convoluted and delayed count, even worse than Iowa's messy result, and the news coverage of who had won was clouded by controversy over the count and varying messages over who had actually won and by how much. On February 28<sup>th</sup> Romney took Arizona and Michigan as expected, but he got less credit for those two victories because of Arizona's large Mormon population and because Michigan was Romney's native state and one where his father, George Romney, had been governor a generation earlier.

Romney then won a quick succession of states, winning Washington on March 3<sup>rd</sup> and Idaho, Massachusetts, Vermont, Virginia and Ohio on March 6<sup>th</sup> which was "Super Tuesday". On that same day, Gingrich won his home state of Georgia which was only his second victory. Santorum's campaign also gained some new momentum from the results of that day as he continued to do well in the southern and border states of Oklahoma and Tennessee. However, Romney also won Virginia handily where Gingrich and Santorum were not even on the ballot. The Santorum and Gingrich campaigns, perhaps because of a lack of funds and staff and perhaps as a strategic failure in planning, did not manage to get together enough petition signatures to get on the ballot in a timely manner in Virginia. The point was made earlier that prior planning is required to play this game successfully, and the abysmal results for Gingrich and Santorum in Virginia which were foreordained by their faulty strategic planning and inadequate resources early in the game emphasize that basic point.

On March 10<sup>th</sup> Santorum won Kansas and on the 13<sup>th</sup> he won both Mississippi and Alabama, thus adding some creditability to his claim of being the “true conservative” in the field. Certainly these two deep-South states helped solidify the image that Santorum was the candidate of the most conservative parts of the nation.

So, taken in total up to this point, Romney was the clear frontrunner and the favorite to win the nomination; however, he had proved to be a somewhat weak frontrunner who often suffered a critical loss each time he seemed ready to become the prohibitive favorite and the inevitable choice for the Republicans. Santorum and Paul kept coming back and Gingrich was still hanging on.

### The Illinois Primary

This prologue set the stage for an Illinois showdown on March 20<sup>th</sup>. Santorum carried a couple of large handicaps into this contest. Because of initial staff deficiencies and money problems, Santorum actually failed to file complete delegate slates in a number of the Illinois congressional districts. This was a real lost opportunity since it deprived him of local support in several crucial areas of the state where he was strong. In addition, Illinois Republicans also tend to support the more “establishment” Republican candidates in their primaries, for example, John McCain in 2008, George W. Bush in 2000, Robert Dole in 1996, George H. W. Bush in 1988, Ronald Reagan in 1980, and Gerald Ford in 1976. In short, the winner of the Republican Primary in Illinois almost always becomes the party’s nominee that year, and the primary has a reliable track record of picking the candidate with the greatest likelihood of gaining the nomination. In addition, in Illinois Republican primaries the more moderate wing of the party tends to be dominant and to prevail in contests with the more conservative wing although this changed marginally in some congressional districts in the 2010 Tea Party uprising.

Almost all of the big name Republicans in Illinois endorsed Romney with only a scattering of name party leaders publicly declaring for Santorum or Gingrich. The polls showed that Romney should win the statewide vote although there were areas of real strength for Santorum in many downstate communities. For example, the Paul Simon Institute’s Southern Illinois poll taken in February of 2012 showed that Santorum had a higher level of support than Romney did throughout southern Illinois (Leonard, 2012). Since delegates are elected by congressional districts, this localized geographical support is not inconsequential; however, the Santorum campaign’s prior failures to file delegate slates would likely prevent them from taking maximum advantage of his localized party strength. Also working against Santorum was the fact that his campaign was vastly outspent in terms of media buys and most of the advertising placed by the Romney campaign and outside groups supporting him was focused on sharply negative ads against Santorum. By then this was a familiar pattern for the Romney campaign and they had perfected the art of massively outspending the opposition on television which

was unremittingly negative against whoever seemed to be the strongest opponent in that particular state. In sum, the Romney campaign enjoyed the advantages of superior organization, far better funding, a better ground game, a much more extensive air war, and the support of most of the major Republican Party leaders in Illinois.

The results were a fairly convincing victory for Romney statewide. He won 46.7% of the statewide popular vote; Santorum followed with 35.0%; Paul with 9.3%; and Gingrich received 7.9% of the popular vote and Perry at less than one percent. The Romney campaign won most of the contested delegate races at the congressional district level. Table 1 details the statewide results.

Table 1

**Vote for President in the Illinois Primary**


<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Vote Totals</u>	<u>Vote Percent</u>
Romney	435,859	46.7
Santorum	326,778	35.0
Paul	87,088	9.3
Gingrich	74,482	7.9
Perry	5,568	0.1
Roemer	3,723	0.1

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections web site

Illinois provided an important victory for Mitt Romney. All of his strengths were on display here and his strategic advantages paid handsome dividends. The results in Table 1 and Map 1 show the dimensions of Romney’s victory which was 11.7% over Santorum. Interestingly enough, on grounds of geography alone, it appears that Romney lost rather decisively to Santorum. Looking at county level victories alone, Santorum took 74 of Illinois’s 102 counties and Romney took only 28. If the state results were comparable to the Electoral College at the national level, Santorum would have won Illinois easily; however, of course, they are not. **(See Map 1).**



# Map 1 - 2012 Republican Presidential Primary Results



	# of Votes	% of Votes	Counties Carried
Romney	435,859	46.7	<span style="color: red;">■</span> - Romney N=28 <span style="color: yellow;">■</span> - Santorum N=74
Santorum	326,778	35.0	
Paul	87,044	9.3	
Gingrich	74,482	7.9	
Other	9,291	0.2	

Total = 933,454 Source: Basic data taken from the Illinois State Board of Elections Website

Geography is an important barometer of party organizational strength at the local level, but since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Baker v. Carr in 1963, population, not geography has been the ultimate metric which counts in American electoral politics (with the notable exception of the Electoral College).

The Romney popular vote victory margin rested mostly on the fact that he won Cook and the surrounding Collar Counties handily. He also won the other bigger and more urban counties such as Peoria, Sangamon, and St. Clair. The biggest counties carried by Santorum were Madison and Williamson in southwestern and southern Illinois, Rock Island in northwestern, and Tazewell and Adams in central Illinois.

So, while Romney only won 24 counties total statewide, he won most of the big prizes. The map of Romney versus Santorum victories at the county level does demonstrate an important schism that exists in the Republican Party in Illinois. This pattern of rural versus urban division has been evident in several earlier races and is one important divide in both Republican and larger statewide politics (Colby and Green, 1986; Jackson, 2004). Despite all of his many disadvantages enumerated above, Santorum simply dominated much of rural and small town Illinois in this primary. His victory in Central, Southern and Northwestern Illinois was almost complete as the map indicates. If the contest had been based on geography, or on county level returns, Santorum would have won a famous victory in the 2012 Illinois Presidential Primary. **(See Appendix A for county by county vote returns).**

It is also relevant to note that Romney won counties where the Republicans are almost certainly not going to win in November, most notably Cook and St. Clair Counties. Santorum won the traditionally loyal Republican strongholds based in the rural and small town areas. These are also the geographical areas where the Christian conservatives based in the evangelical churches and some Catholic churches are strong, and this was a key constituency which favored Santorum both in Illinois and nationally. It may also be that Romney's Mormon faith was a disadvantage for him in some of these areas. These are also parts of the state where opposition to any kind of gun control legislation is particularly vehement. Come November, Romney will likely win most if not all of those more rural and less populated counties he lost to Santorum in the primary. This will be because party loyalty, ideology and a few single issues will dominate their voting choices. That will not be enough to win the statewide vote.

The real toss-up and the crucial litmus test for how well any candidate will do in Illinois is now the suburbs around Chicago. Suburban Cook and the five Collar Counties are where statewide candidates win or lose in Illinois elections. From the end of World War II onward the suburbs were typically Republican in their voting patterns. However, in the past two decades, as the suburbs have become more diverse, their voting habits have changed and now Democrats do well in many of the suburban enclaves where they may have moved from the city

or where a more diverse ethnic and socio-economic mixture has changed the face of the typical suburbanite. This is also an area where the Republicans who do win tend to be more moderate to liberal on the social issues and moderate to conservative on fiscal issues. As a result, the Collar Counties as a whole still tend to lean Republican, but a strong and competitive Democrat can win there and a number have done so in recent elections. Obama took all of the five Collar Counties as well as winning suburban Cook by a wide margin in the November 2008 general election. In 2010, the moderate, Mark Kirk, won the suburbs in his race for the U S Senate seat which had been vacated by Barack Obama; however, the Republican candidate for Governor, Bill Brady, who was a social and fiscal conservative, ran behind Kirk and performed well below what Republicans must do in the Collar Counties to be viable statewide. In spite of winning 98 of the 102 total counties in Illinois, Brady lost to Pat Quinn in the Governor's race (Jackson, 2010). So, the suburbs now hold the balance of power in the general elections in Illinois in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and the 2012 election will not be an exception to that rule.

### The Denouement

The loss of Illinois certainly hurt Santorum and the other Republican candidates and helped Romney in their 2012 race. Santorum needed a win in Illinois and didn't get it. Santorum made a brief comeback five days later by winning Louisiana on March 24<sup>th</sup> thus continuing Romney's problems with the South. However, Romney got back on track when he won the District of Columbia on April 3<sup>rd</sup>, and he scored a big victory by winning Wisconsin on that same day.

Wisconsin was undoubtedly Santorum's swan song in 2012. After Santorum's loss there, he and the media began to place all of their emphasis on the importance of his winning his home state of Pennsylvania where the primary was scheduled for April 24<sup>th</sup>. Virtually everyone, including the Santorum camp, agreed that it was do or die for Santorum in Pennsylvania. The polls at first showed him ahead, but as the date grew closer, Romney narrowed the margin once again with the spending of large sums of money on television. The polls then began to show the race to be a dead heat between Santorum and Romney.

Perhaps looking at those polls, as well as his depleted bank account, Santorum suspended his campaign on April 10<sup>th</sup>. It was only one week after his crucial loss in Wisconsin and two weeks before Pennsylvania. The pressure from within the Republican Establishment was undoubtedly overwhelming on Santorum by then. He was increasingly having trouble raising money and was getting outspent drastically on television advertising-a disadvantage which no challenger candidate can afford. Republican Party leaders wanted Santorum out of the race so Romney could concentrate his attention and financial resources on President Obama. Romney was ready to move on and only Ron Paul remained as a minor irritant after Santorum dropped out. **(See Appendix B for the 2012 calendar and selection type by state).**

Ron Paul did stay in the race and continued to amass delegates in unexpected places. For example, it was announced on June 16th that Paul had actually won the Iowa State Convention vote and that he had won the Nevada State Convention, and earlier results showed that Paul won the state convention delegates in Louisiana and Maine (Wyler, 2012). This meant that in effect he would control their delegations to the national convention. These Ron Paul victories threatened to cause headaches for Romney later at the national convention, but they did not detract from the media message which was that Romney was the “presumptive nominee”. It was not until May 29<sup>th</sup> after his victory in Texas that Romney officially cinched the nomination and had enough committed delegates to ensure his victory on the first ballot roll call; however, politically it was all over when Santorum lost Wisconsin and suspended his campaign. After that date, all eyes then turned to the fall campaign and the coming battle between Romney and Obama. The polls showed that it was likely to be a close race. Various national polls showed most divisions between Obama and Romney to be up and down and the differences usually within the margin of error. As different news stories and ad campaigns gained traction and came and then went, each candidate enjoyed temporary advantage or suffered temporary disadvantage, but the overall poll results presaged a close popular vote.

The Electoral College arithmetic was more important and looked a little different. If one focused only on the nine or ten states that were the consensus toss-up or battleground states, President Obama tended to have a modest advantage. He consistently led the polls in more of these states than Romney did. On the money race, Romney erased Obama’s initial lead by early May and in June and July he was far outdistancing Obama on that measure. After the Citizens United court decision, Super PACs came to dominate more and more of the campaign fundraising. Their advertising significantly favored Romney and PACs friendly to Obama faced problems in trying to keep up. Since money translates into television advertising which can potentially influence the undecided and the more marginally informed, this advantage for Romney could not be discounted. In addition, as the race progressed, it became increasingly evident that because of the polarized nature of our politics, the undecided and the more marginally involved in the nine or ten battleground states would determine the outcome. All indicators pointed to a close race in the fall.

### Conclusion

As we look back, Romney won the Illinois Primary as expected. Romney had all the earmarks of the kind of candidate who typically wins in Illinois and who traditionally wins the Republican nomination. The GOP almost always nominates a candidate who has run before. George W. Bush is the only modern exception to that rule and he had helped his father, the former president, to run three times previously and was certainly well known to the party leaders. Romney was clearly the party organizational leadership’s choice, and he enjoyed their

prominent support in Illinois. Romney had the best and more experienced personal organization and was by far the best financed of the Republican candidates. Again, that is almost always an important marker of which candidate will ultimately win the nomination. This is not to diminish the Romney victory. It took good strategic planning and smart decisions to take advantage of all of these natural resources. But his victory, while not inevitable, was the most probable outcome for both Illinois and in the national race.

Consider for a moment the counterfactual scenario. Santorum quite plausibly could have come out of Illinois with a victory. He was at the height of his popularity and momentum at the Illinois juncture. If he had won, Illinois would have proven to be a tremendous boost to the Santorum campaign. It would have stimulated his fundraising and galvanized the media's attention. It would have given him a tremendous boost for the upcoming primary in neighboring Wisconsin. Wisconsin was after all the state deeply divided over Governor Scott Walker's stripping public employee unions of many of their rights as well as reducing their pay. The protests and then recall battle that followed showed great emotion and fervor on both sides; however, the kinds of forces mobilized, and some of the financial interests, especially from the Koch brothers who have extensive holdings in Wisconsin, could easily have also been fertile grounds for Rick Santorum's appeal. His Tea Party roots were also some of the same roots which fed Governor Walker.

Then a victory in Wisconsin could have provided a major boost to Santorum in his native state of Pennsylvania where he might have done well if he was coming off the momentum from both Illinois and Wisconsin. The voters in Central, Southern and Northwestern Illinois, who showed their strong affinity for Santorum in the Illinois Primary, could have then prevailed and altered the nominations outcome. He did, after all, win 74 counties and most of the state.

Of course, none of that happened. Romney won the expected victory in Illinois and it became an important building block in his march toward the presidential nomination. Illinois was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Romney's long range strategy. Illinois was an important state for Romney because it is a big, diverse Midwestern state, a "bellwether" which almost always backs the winners of the nomination. Illinois became an important proving ground for Romney's candidacy. It is the kind of state that so mirrors the national population that it can serve as a surrogate test of the candidate's appeal to a much larger and more diverse audience (Colby and Green, 1986; Jackson, 2004; Jackson, 2007; Jackson, 2011).

In addition, because the nominations race went on longer than most initially expected it would, and longer than most recent Republican races had lasted, the contest was still in doubt when the calendar turned to the Illinois primary. Santorum was still a viable candidate when the race got to Illinois. But, months earlier, in the fall of 2011, Santorum's campaign planners and staff, to the extent he had much staff back then, had largely overlooked Illinois and its

potentially pivotal place in the calendar, and thus they did not get to Illinois and recruit delegate candidates nearly early enough and they did not allocate resources to the effort here. This strategic failure was also evident in Virginia and several other key states and it was also a mark of the Gingrich campaign. This strategic error was reminiscent of Gary Hart's campaign in Illinois and elsewhere in 1984 when he made some of the same bad choices and oversights in his challenge to Walter Mondale. Their failure illustrates the importance of early strategic planning, the importance of the candidate's campaign organization and what early money can buy and what its absence can cost in terms of the probability for success. Early and extensive organization, planning, and access to early money spells the difference between being crowned the party's winner in the national convention, and potentially in November, and the host of also-rans who crowd the pages of campaign history.

So, in 2012 the Santorum campaign and all the other GOP candidates' campaigns in Illinois provide a cautionary tale. A candidate with national aspirations- or even a plausible chance to become the party nominee- overlooks Illinois, and all of the other big and diverse states like it, potentially at his or her peril. Illinois is worth competing for in most years. Romney's campaign recognized this basic component of any good strategic plan early on and met the test. With his superior organization and great financial advantage, Romney planned well and methodically, and he persistently marched through the calendar. When he lost one Romney had the resources to continue the fight. Illinois became one important stop-over in that successful drive through the primary season and the victory here helped lead him to the pinnacle of Republican politics and within grasp of national power. Other candidates in the future will do well to learn from Romney's 2012 game plan and to profit from Santorum's mistakes.

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## Appendix A

County	Obama Democratic	Terry Democratic	Romney Republican	Santorum Republican	Paul Republican	Gingrich Republican
Adams	1173	0	2881	3706	436	685
Alexander	285	0	107	267	28	25
Bond	375	0	454	567	181	126
Boone	905	0	2641	2241	687	546
Brown	118	0	198	262	46	70
Bureau	1032	0	1599	1875	321	379
Calhoun	806	0	114	132	15	38
Carroll	453	0	952	1096	358	214
Cass	301	0	323	387	70	102
Champaign	7499	11	7515	6010	2323	1679
Christian	1551	0	823	1059	228	286
Clark	495	0	694	1403	168	243
Clay	226	0	389	794	115	136
Clinton	420	0	1118	1352	271	243
Coles	1353	0	2349	2331	683	544
Cook	402495	53	112736	52489	18426	13085
Crawford	471	0	768	1372	129	301
Cumberland	353	0	367	885	171	116
DeKalb	1880	0	4201	3620	1317	896
DeWitt	509	0	1421	1259	520	350
Douglas	300	0	1242	1240	392	363
DuPage	28821	0	57015	29715	10310	7109
Edgar	319	0	920	994	186	288
Edwards	108	0	214	526	83	119
Effingham	1002	0	1142	2887	368	282
Fayette	368	1	636	986	225	178
Ford	143	0	949	1133	337	215
Franklin	3816	0	892	1775	189	236
Fulton	2005	0	1023	1096	214	229
Gallatin	897	0	104	141	20	34
Greene	793	0	481	625	207	155
Grundy	1548	0	2065	1858	428	449
Hamilton	671	0	229	566	66	74
Hancock	371	0	1155	1782	353	329
Hardin	341	0	207	315	57	61
Henderson	204	0	194	398	65	45
Henry	1416	0	1598	2186	322	344
Iroquois	279	3	1993	2191	569	553
Jackson	2287	0	1332	1576	363	325
Jasper	314	0	324	817	53	119
Jefferson	2616	14	964	2348	292	276
Jersey	676	0	628	821	187	171
Jo Daviess	603	0	1357	1405	580	343
Johnson	385	0	604	1310	179	200

Pink shaded counties carried by Romney N= 28

Yellow shaded counties carried by Santorum N= 74 Total N= 102

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections.

## Appendix A

Kane	10574	0	19821	13074	3792	3349
Kankakee	3710	3	3320	3021	570	697
Kendall	2471	0	5029	4078	1118	950
Knox	1591	0	1651	1879	313	364
Lake	28418	7	33445	16667	4942	4102
LaSalle	3487	0	4077	3956	956	970
Lawrence	396	0	408	701	92	173
Lee	678	0	1646	2452	449	394
Livingston	510	0	2754	2479	561	582
Logan	326	2	1525	1665	342	421
Macon	5229	9	4254	3130	864	1085
Macoupin	3116	0	1099	1344	283	305
Madison	8581	0	7084	7900	1815	1642
Marion	871	0	911	1354	224	254
Marshall	218	0	612	710	130	134
Mason	1310	0	452	484	82	124
Massac	324	0	497	890	145	161
McDonough	830	0	1277	1388	323	347
McHenry	5281	0	15449	10602	3498	2911
McClellan	2850	0	9070	8068	2236	1800
Menard	169	0	691	623	133	155
Mercer	1266	0	609	1146	191	120
Monroe	1035	0	1188	1373	253	215
Montgomery	1031	0	727	1040	202	233
Morgan	950	0	1846	1514	523	425
Moultrie	361	0	572	673	196	178
Ogle	831	0	3266	3681	895	737
Peoria	4970	0	7650	6147	1177	1328
Perry	762	0	436	888	88	131
Piatt	489	0	1228	1042	402	323
Pike	1127	0	713	1001	186	200
Pope	319	0	202	344	59	69
Pulaski	219	0	170	342	34	56
Putnam	603	0	261	250	45	64
Randolph	2490	0	706	1026	180	180
Richland	385	0	425	939	146	163
Rock Island	10328	0	3653	4223	642	623
Saline	1006	0	666	1195	149	198
Sangamon	5364	10	9601	6577	1830	1699
Schuyler	379	0	379	450	93	102
Scott	171	0	345	462	145	150
Shelby	639	0	804	1303	411	246
St. Clair	15966	10	6610	6377	1230	1193
Stark	88	0	322	299	73	83
Stephenson	1500	1	1966	2405	661	484
Tazewell	2954	0	6503	7503	1429	1400
Union	1485	0	583	1147	184	199

Pink shaded counties carried by Romney N= 28

Yellow shaded counties carried by Santorum N= 74 Total N= 102

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections.

Appendix A

Vermilion	1508	1	2473	2624	657	810
Wabash	203	0	356	557	70	119
Warren	450	0	852	1044	194	155
Washington	499	0	1179	1313	242	204
Wayne	309	0	605	1074	141	228
White	551	0	427	728	148	139
Whiteside	2229	0	1498	2232	321	314
Will	20612	8	26218	17660	4617	4345
Williamson	2877	0	2051	3661	462	591
Winnebago	12203	0	12487	10977	2921	2722
Woodford	501	1	2292	3298	441	575
Totals	652583	134	435859	326778	87044	74482

Pink shaded counties carried by Romney N= 28

Yellow shaded counties carried by Santorum N= 74 Total N= 102

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections.

Appendix B  
2012 Presidential Primaries and Caucus Calendar

Month		Selection Method	Number of Delegates Chosen	Primary Type
January	3	Iowa Caucus/Convention	28	
	10	New Hampshire Primary	12	Proportional
	21	South Carolina Primary	25	Winner-take-all
	31	Florida Primary	50	Winner-take-all
February	4	Nevada Caucus/Convention	28	
	7	Colorado Caucus/Convention	36	
	7	Minnesota Caucus/Convention	40	
	7	Missouri Primary/Non-binding		Delegates chosen later in convention.
	11	Maine Caucus/Convention	24	
	28	Arizona Primary	29	Winner-take-all
	28	Michigan Primary	30	Winner-take-all
March	1	Wyoming Caucus	29	
	3	Washington Caucus/Convention	43	
	6	Alaska Caucus/Convention	27	
	6	Georgia Primary	76	Winner-take-all
	6	Idaho Caucus/Convention	32	
	6	Massachusetts Primary	41	Proportional
	6	North Dakota Caucus/Convention	28	
	6	Ohio Primary	66	Winner-take-all
	6	Oklahoma Primary	43	Winner-take-all
	6	Tennessee Primary	58	Winner-take-all if majority; Otherwise: proportional
	6	Vermont Primary	17	Winner-take-all if majority; Otherwise: proportional
	6	Virginia Primary	49	Winner-take-all if majority; Otherwise: proportional
	10	Guam Caucus/Convention	9	
	10	Kansas Caucus/Convention	40	
	10	Northern Marianas Caucus/Convention	9	
	10	Virgin Islands Caucus/Convention	9	
	13	Alabama Primary	50	Winner-take-all proportional/statewide
	13	American Samoa Caucus/Convention	9	

Appendix B  
2012 Presidential Primaries and Caucus Calendar

	13	Hawaii	Caucus/Convention	20		
	13	Mississippi	Primary	40	Winner-take-all if majority; otherwise: proportional	
	17	Missouri	Caucus	52		
	18	Puerto Rico	Caucus/Convention	23		
	20	Illinois	Primary	69	Loophole; Winner-take-all; selection at C.D. level	
	24	Louisiana	Primary + Caucus/Convention	46		
April	3	Washington, D.C.	Primary	19	Winner-take-all	
	3	Maryland	Primary	37	Winner-take-all	
	3	Wisconsin	Primary	42	Winner-take-all	
	24	Connecticut	Primary	28	Winner-take-all if majority; otherwise: proportional	
	24	Delaware	Primary	17	Winner-take-all	
	24	New York	Primary	95	Winner-take-all if majority; otherwise: proportional	
	24	Pennsylvania	Primary	72	Loophole; winner-take-all	
	24	Rhode Island	Primary	19	Proportional	
May	8	Indiana	Primary + Caucus/Convention	46	Winner-take-all	
	8	North Carolina	Primary	55	Proportional	
	8	West Virginia	Primary + Caucus/Convention	31	Winner-take-all	
	15	Nebraska	Primary	35	Advisory	
	15	Oregon	Primary	28	Proportional	
	15	Arkansas	Primary	36	Proportional	
	15	Kentucky	Primary	45	Proportional	
	29	Texas	Primary	155	Proportional	
June	5	California	Primary	172	Winner-take-all	
	5	Montana	Primary	26	Winner-take-all	
	5	New Jersey	Primary	50	Winner-take-all	
	5	New Mexico	Primary	23	Proportional	
	5	South Dakota	Primary	28	Proportional	
	26	Utah	Primary	40	Winner-take-all	